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Abstract
Research has shown that there are strong similarities in content between the obsessions and
compulsions that characterize obsessive–compulsive disorder and nonclinical obsessions and
compulsions. However, clinical and nonclinical obsessions and compulsions do dier with respect to
characteristics like frequency, intensity, discomfort and elicited resistance. Two separate concepts have
been invoked to explain how normal obsessions and compulsions may develop into clinical phenomena.
First, it is suggested that thought–action fusion (TAF) contributes to obsessive–compulsive symptoms.
Second, thought suppression may intensify obsessive–compulsive symptoms due to its paradoxical eect
on intrusive thoughts. Although both phenomena have been found to contribute to obsessive–
compulsive symptoms, possible interactions between these two have never been investigated. The current
study explored how TAF and thought suppression interact in the development of obsessive–compulsive
symptoms. Undergraduate psychology students (N= 173) completed questionnaires pertaining to TAF,
thought suppression and obsessive–compulsive symptoms. Covariances between the scores on these
questionnaires were analyzed by means of structural equation modeling. Results suggest that TAF
triggers thought suppression, while thought suppression, in turn, promotes obsessive–compulsive
symptoms. 7 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Obsessions and compulsions are the core features of obsessive–compulsive disorder
(OCD). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV; APA, 1994, p. 418) ‘‘obsessions are persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images
that are experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or
distress’’. Most obsessions involve thoughts about contamination, repeated doubts, a need
to have things in a particular order, aggressive impulses, or sexual imagery (Rachman &
Hodgson, 1980). DSM-IV defines compulsions as ‘‘repetitive behaviors (e.g. hand washing,
ordering, checking) or mental acts (e.g. praying, counting, repeating words silently) the
goal of which is to prevent or reduce anxiety or distress, not to provide pleasure or
gratification. In most cases, the person feels driven to perform the compulsion to reduce
the distress that accompanies an obsession or to prevent some dreaded event or situation’’
(APA, 1994, p. 418). The most common compulsions involve cleaning and checking
(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).
There is evidence to suggest that a majority of people experiences unpleasant intrusions
similar to the obsessions seen in OCD. For example, Rachman and De Silva (1978) (see also
Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984) examined obsessive thinking in nonclinical subjects and OCD
patients. These authors noted that about 80% of the nonclinical subjects experienced
obsessions. Furthermore, they found remarkable similarities between ‘abnormal’ and ‘normal’
obsessions as far as the content of these obsessions is concerned. However, abnormal
obsessions were found to be more frequent, intense, of longer duration and to produce more
discomfort than normal obsessions. Muris, Merckelbach and Clavan (1997) compared
compulsive behaviors of OCD patients with rituals of normal subjects. In accordance with the
studies on abnormal and normal obsessions, these authors found a close correspondence
between the content of abnormal and normal compulsions. Again, however, abnormal
compulsions were more frequent and intense, elicited more discomfort and were more often
associated with distressing thoughts and negative mood than normal compulsions. Taken
together, these studies seem to demonstrate that normal intrusions and rituals and their clinical
counterparts constitute one dimension.
Researchers have speculated about the antecedents that may be involved in the
transformation of normal intrusions and rituals. Two main research lines have addressed this
issue in a systematic and well-articulated manner. The first can best be referred to as the
cognitive theory of obsession (Salkovskis, 1985; Rachman, 1993, 1997, 1998). The core
assumption of this approach is that the interpretation that a person gives to an intrusive
thought determines the obsessive qualities of that intrusion. By this view, a person who feels
extremely responsible for his or her thoughts, will experience more discomfort when an
‘immoral’ thought (e.g. about sex or violence) intrudes consciousness than a person without
such an inflated sense of responsibility. Persons suering from an exaggerated sense of
responsibility may think that immoral intrusions indicate them to be bad. Such an appraisal
may add obsessive qualities (e.g. increased discomfort, tension, anxiety and resistance) to
intrusive thoughts. Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran and Woody (1995), presented a refined
version of this cognitive account of OCD. That is, their work demonstrated that two types of
cognitive biases are specifically associated with obsessive–compulsive symptoms. The first bias
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implies that having a thought of a particular, unpleasant situation (e.g. a car accident)
increases the likelihood that such situation will actually occur. This bias is known as likelihood
or probability bias. The second bias boils down to the notion that having immoral thoughts
(even involuntary ones) about, for example, violence is as bad as immoral behavior (e.g. acting
violently). The latter bias is referred to as morality bias. Together, probability and morality
bias constitute the concept of ‘thought–action fusion’ (TAF; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman,
1996). TAF is thought to represent the tendency to overevaluate the significance and
consequences of intrusive thoughts.
A second research line has emphasized the role of thought suppression in the exacerbation of
intrusive thoughts. There is evidence to suggest that cognitive avoidance strategies such as
thought suppression may be counterproductive. For example, Wegner, Schneider, Carter and
White (1987) found that suppression attempts result in more rather than less intrusions. This
paradoxical phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘white bear eect’. Clearly, an increased
frequency of unwanted intrusions is in itself an obsessive feature. In addition, a heightened
frequency may lead to more discomfort and increased perceived intensity. Accordingly, Wegner
(1989, p. 167) claims that the paradoxical eect of thought suppression can result in full blown
obsessions: ‘‘An obsession can grow from nothing but the desire to suppress a thought’’.
Note, in passing, that both research lines have focused on factors that intensify intrusive
thinking, thereby assuming that compulsive behaviors are a function of intrusive thinking. In
this view, compulsions can best be understood as a response to obsessions. This would imply
that an exacerbation of intrusions is followed by an increase in compulsive behavior. There are
good reasons to believe that both TAF (see Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant & Teachman,
1996) and thought suppression (see Rassin, Merckelbach & Muris, in press), indeed, contribute
to the exacerbation of obsessive–compulsive symptoms. However, little is known about the
interactions between TAF and thought suppression. Of course, TAF may trigger suppression
attempts. In Rachman’s (1998, p. 393) words: ‘‘an inflated increase in the significance attached
to an unwanted intrusive thought, such as an obsession, will lead to more vigorous and intense
attempts to suppress such thoughts’’. Another possibility is that the interaction between TAF
and suppression takes the form of a vicious circle, ‘‘Given that patients can misinterpret the
frequency with which they experience the obsession as evidence for the importance of the
obsession ( . . . ), paradoxical increases in frequency that arise from attempts at suppression,
may actually strengthen the catastrophic misinterpretation themselves. A vicious cycle is
established’’ (Rachman, 1998, p. 394). Still other interactions become possible when the two
TAF components of probability and morality are considered separately (S. Rachman, pers.
comm., September 29, 1998). One could argue, for instance, that TAF-probability may be
directly related to obsessive–compulsive symptoms. Consider this example: a man who is
plagued by a probability bias experiences an intrusion about his wife being involved in a car
accident. Subsequent suppression attempts (even if successful) will not be sucient to reassure
him. Therefore, rather than cognitively avoiding the intrusion, he will engage in actions or
cognitions that prevent the expected consequences (i.e., his wife actually crashing her car) from
happening. For example, he might ask his wife not to travel by car, or he might engage in
mental acts (e.g. praying). Thus, a probability bias may directly fuel obsessive–compulsive
symptoms. On the other hand, a morality bias does not necessarily force the person who
experiences an immoral intrusion to prevent anticipated consequences, since this type of bias
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does not involve such consequences. Following this line of reasoning, morality does not trigger
neutralizing rituals, but it may give rise to suppression, as intrusions are experienced as
extremely unpleasant. If this analysis is correct, one would predict that probability directly
increases obsessive–compulsive symptoms, whereas morality is thought to trigger suppression
attempts which, in turn, lead via the paradoxical eect of thought suppression, to obsessive–
compulsive symptoms. To sum up, then, there are a number of intuitively plausible models
about the dynamics between TAF, thought suppression and OCD. Yet, empirical evidence to
evaluate the merits of these models is lacking.
The present study explored possible interactions between TAF and thought suppression in
the exacerbation of obsessive–compulsive symptoms. Normal subjects completed questionnaires
measuring TAF, thought suppression and obsessive–compulsive symptoms. Then, the
relationships between these three constructs were examined by means of structural equation
modeling. A number of plausible models were tested. In the first model, TAF and thought
suppression independently contribute to obsessive–compulsive symptoms. In the second model,
TAF leads to thought suppression, which, in turn, results in obsessive–compulsive symptoms.
To investigate whether thought suppression actually is an antecedent of obsessive–compulsive
symptoms, or rather, a consequence of such symptoms, a third model was tested in which TAF
leads to obsessive–compulsive symptoms, whereas these symptoms trigger thought suppression.
In the fourth and fifth model, TAF was broken down in its probability and morality
components. Model 4 followed the same route as model 2, which means that both probability
and morality result in thought suppression, while thought suppression leads to obsessive–
compulsive symptoms. Model 5 tested the hypothesis that probability is directly related to
obsessive–compulsive symptoms, whereas morality indirectly influences these symptoms
through thought suppression. Fig. 1 provides schematic representations of the 5 models. Note
that Fig. 1 also provides empirically established path coecients.
2. Method
2.1. Subjects
A sample of 173 undergraduate psychology students (131 females) participated in the study.
They received a small financial compensation for their participation. Mean age was 19.1 years
(S.D.=1.7; range: 17–28 years).
2.2. Materials
Subjects completed the following self-report questionnaires. The thought–action fusion scale
(TAF scale; Shafran et al., 1996) consists of 19 items which are scored on a 5-point answer
format (0=disagree strongly; 4=agree strongly ). The TAF scale taps two components (cf.
supra): probability (7 items, e.g. ‘‘If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this
increases the risk that he/she will have a car accident’’) and morality (12 items, e.g. ‘‘If I wish
harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm’’). A total TAF score can be calculated
by summing all items. Higher scores indicate a stronger TAF tendency and, by implication, an
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Fig. 1. Schematic representations of the 5 models.
inflated sense of responsibility for one’s own thoughts. The white bear suppression inventory
(WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) consists of 15 items pertaining to the chronic tendency to
suppress unwanted thoughts. WBSI items (e.g. ‘‘I always try to put problems out of mind’’) are
scored on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree ). Thus, total scores range
from 15 to 75, with higher scores reflecting stronger tendencies to suppress unpleasant
thoughts. The Maudsley obsessive–compulsive inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977)
consists of 30 true/false items describing various obsessive–compulsive symptoms such as
checking (e.g. ‘‘My major problem is repeated checking’’), cleaning (e.g. ‘‘I avoid using public
telephones because of possible contamination’’), doubting (e.g. ‘‘Even when I do something
very carefully I often feel that it is not quite right’’) and slowness (e.g. ‘‘I am often late because
I can’t seem to get through everything on time’’). Every endorsed item yields one point, so that
total scores range from 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating the presence of more obsessive–
compulsive symptoms.
2.3. Analyses
The structural equation modeling program EQS (Bentler, 1989) was used to analyze the
data. EQS combines multiple regression and path analysis. It provides a powerful approach to
test plausible models that may underlie a data set. EQS produces several goodness-of-fit indices
indicating how well the tested model accounts for the observed correlational structure of the
data. In the present study, the following indices were used: (1) the w2 goodness of fit value,
which is required to be nonsignificant for the tested model to provide a good fit for the data,
(2) the average o diagonal absolute standardized residuals (AASR), which should not exceed
0.05 in order for the model to fit the data well, (3) Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) which
is a fit index that takes into account the parsimony of the tested model (i.e., the number of
included paths); AIC is a relative measure: that is to say, the model with the smallest number
provides the best fit and (4) the comparative fit index (CFI) which compares the fit of the
model with the hypothetical model in which none of the variables are correlated. A CFI of
0.90 or higher indicates that the tested model fits the data well (see, for an extensive discussion
of these indices, Schumacker & Lomax, 1996).
3. Results
Mean score on the TAF scale was 21.1 (S.D.=10.4). Means for the probability and morality
subscales were 7.0 (S.D.=4.8) and 14.2 (S.D.=7.8), respectively. The average WBSI score was
50.6 (S.D.=9.7) and the mean score on the MOCI was 6.7 (S.D.=4.7). The internal
consistency of the total TAF scale (a=0.87), TAF-probability (a=0.77), TAF-morality
(a=0.86), WBSI (a=0.86) and MOCI (a=0.76) proved to be satisfactory. Table 1 presents
Pearson product–moment correlations between the various questionnaires.
The fit indices for the 5 models are summarized in Table 2. As can be seen, models 1 and 3
provide poor fits for the data. The w2 values reach significance ( p< 0.05) and the unexplained
variances of these models (AASR) exceed 0.05.
Models 2, 4 and 5 have satisfactory fits. The w2 values for these models all remain
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nonsignificant ( p> 0.05), there is little unexplained variance (AASR< 0.05) and the CFIs are
good (>0.90). Note also that model 5 (in which probability leads to obsessive–compulsive
symptoms and morality leads to thought suppression) produces the best fit. The w2 value is
nonsignificant ( p=0.39), the residuals are small (AASR=0.03) and the CFI is high (1.00).
4. Discussion
The current results can be interpreted as follows. First, TAF and thought suppression seem
to interact in the development of obsessive–compulsive symptoms, in that TAF leads to
suppression attempts, while suppression, paradoxically, results in more obsessive–compulsive
symptoms (model 2). This causal chain is more likely than a scenario in which TAF and
suppression independently contribute to such symptoms (model 1). Furthermore, the results
suggest that suppression is, indeed, an antecedent of obsessive–compulsive symptoms, rather
than a mere reaction to such symptoms (as is the case in model 3). When TAF is broken down
into its probability and morality components, a causal model assuming that these two biases
trigger thought suppression, which, in turn, results in more obsessive–compulsive symptoms,
still provides a good fit for the data (model 4). However, given the data, it seems more likely
that the probability bias directly aects obsessive–compulsive symptoms (model 5).
Some limitations of the present study should be acknowledged. First, the study relied on a
Table 1
Pearson correlations between the various questionnaires. N=173; TAF=thought–action fusion scale; WBSI=white
bear suppression inventory; MOCI=Maudsley obsessive–compulsive inventory. p<0.01
TAF-total TAF-probability TAF-morality WBSI
TAF-probability 0.70 –
TAF-morality 0.90 0.32 –
WBSI 0.24 0.16 0.21 –
MOCI 0.21 0.23 0.13 0.41
Table 2
Fit-indices for the 5 models. AASR=average o-diagonal absolute standardized residuals; AIC=Akaike’s
information criterion; CFI=comparative fit index
w2 p AASR AIC CFI
Model 1 9.77 0.00 0.12 7.77 0.78
Model 2 2.54 0.11a 0.04a 0.54 0.96a
Model 3 7.69 0.02 0.05 3.69 0.86
Model 4 5.73 0.06a 0.04a 1.73 0.94a
Model 5 1.87 0.39a 0.03a ÿ2.13a 1.00a
a Indicative for a good fit.
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sample of healthy subjects. Future studies should examine whether the current results can be
replicated in a clinical sample. Second, the study relied on concurrent measurements.
Nevertheless, the results fit nicely with current theoretical notions on the etiology of obsessive–
compulsive symptoms and they may help to design experiments examining the interactions
between TAF and suppression.
The current findings imply that TAF is a more fundamental cause of obsessive–compulsive
symptoms than is thought suppression. Given that the models 2, 4 and 5 all fit better than
model 1, thought suppression seems to have an intermediate role between TAF and obsessive–
compulsive symptoms, rather than a primary causal one. This underscores the idea that
therapeutic interventions for OCD should address patients’ cognitive biases. To the extent that
these biases are corrected, the urge to engage in thought suppression should also decrease. On
the other hand, reducing the chronic avoidant coping style, would leave the TAF bias intact.
This analysis suggests that the TAF bias deserves priority. Thus, the present results support
Rachman’s conclusion ‘‘that the most direct and satisfactory treatment of obsessions is to
assist patients in the modification of the putatively causal catastrophic misinterpretations of the
significance of their intrusive thoughts. Bluntly, if these misinterpretations are ‘corrected’, the
obsession should cease’’ (1997, p. 799).
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